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Note
The Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act and The Nuremberg
Fies Web Site: Is the Site Properly
Prohibited or Protected Speech?
by
MELANIE C. HAGAN*
On February 2, 1999, in the case of Planned Parenthood v.
American Coalition of Life Activists,' an eight-member federal jury in
Portland, Oregon unanimously determined that the Web site known
as The Nuremberg Files, as well as printed "wanted-style" posters
known as The Deadly Dozen, both listing personal information
regarding abortion physicians, were threats2 prohibited under the
1994 Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE).3 The jury
ordered damages of more than $100 million be paid to the plaintiffs,
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2000; B.A.
Dartmouth College, 1993. I would like to thank Professors Ashutosh Bhagwat and David
Faigman for commenting on earlier drafts of this note.
1. To date, three opinions have been published regarding this litigation, all from the
District of Oregon. First, the court ruled on a motion to dismiss. See Planned Parenthood
of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355
(D. Or. 1996)[hereinafter Planned Parenthood I]. Second, the court ruled on a motion for
summary judgment. See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American
Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998) [hereinafter Planned
Parenthood II]. Finally, the court enjoined defendants from "continuing their unlawful
threats that place plaintiffs' lives in peril." Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of
Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1154 (D. Or. 1999) [hereinafter Planned Parenthood
III'.
2. See Associated Press, Anti-Abortion Web Site Amounts to Threat, Jury Says, N.Y.
TIMES ON THE WEB, Feb. 2, 1999 (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.nyt.com/library/
techl99/02lbiztechlarticles/O2abortion.html>; PPCW vs. ACLA fact sheet, (visited
February 23,1999) <http://www.ppcw.org/trialfct.html>.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1998).
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comprised of five individual physicians and two health clinics.4 On
March 16, 1999, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for a permanent
injunction against both the Web site and dissemination of the Deadly
Dozen posters.5
The plaintiffs brought suit in October 1995, seeking
approximately $200 million in damages as well as injunctive relief
from American Coalition of Life Advocates, Advocates for Life
Ministries and several individual anti-abortion activists for
disseminating private information and threats about the five
physicians. 6 The complaint was later amended to include allegations
concerning the Web site.7 FACE imposes liability on any person
who "by force or threat of force... intimidates... or attempts to...
intimidate... any person because that person is... providing
reproductive health services."'8 After plaintiffs survived a motion to
dismiss9 and a motion for summary judgment,1 0 the trial began in
January 1999. This suit is believed to be the first brought under
FACE involving no violent confrontation, physical obstruction of a
clinic entrance or direct, person-to-person threat."
In ruling on defendants' summary judgment motion, the district
court acknowledged that "no statement contained in the text of...
the Nuremberg Files is expressly threatening. 1 2 The court held,
however, that given the "period of escalating violence against
abortion providers reaching back at least to the murder of Dr. David
Gunn in March 1993,'1 3 whether the site amounted to a threat was an
issue for the trier of fact.' 4
This Note examines the free speech issues arising from this
unique context-the intersection of the Internet with FACE.
4. See Associated Press, supra note 2.
5. See Planned Parenthood 111, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
6. See Patrick McMahon, Anti-Abortion Web Site on Trial in Ore., USA TODAY, Jan.
7, 1999, at 3A, available in 1999 WL 6830839. Plaintiffs also asserted Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and Oregon Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("ORICO") claims. See Planned Parenthood II, 23 F.
Supp. 2d at 1182. For purposes of this Note, however, these claims will not be examined in
any detail.
7. See Roger Parloff, In a High-Profile Case, Paul, Weiss Partner Maria Vullo Leads
the Charge Against Antiabortion Extremists, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, July 1999, at 91.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1998).
9. See Planned Parenthood I, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1355 (1996).
10. See Planned Parenthood 11, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
11. See News Service Reports, Suit Begins over Web Site of Anti-Abortion Activists,
THE RECORD, NORTHERN NEW JERSEY, Jan. 7, 1999, at A14, available in 1999 WL
7085473.
12. Planned Parenthood 11, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
13. Id. at 1188.
14. See id. at 1189.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
Following a brief description of the Web site itself, this Note explores
the background of FACE's enactment and reviews the relevant
federal jurisprudence 5 answering First Amendment challenges to
FACE. Next, this Note briefly surveys the federal courts' limited
experience with the Internet by examining Reno v. ACLU,16 the
controversy surrounding the Communications Decency Act and looks
at lower court cases involving alleged threats published on the
Internet. Suggestions for Internet regulation are then scrutinized and
evaluated for utility in addressing the problem of Internet threats,
emphasizing that current threat/incitement doctrine is inadequate to
address the exceptional issues raised by Internet communication.
This Note will analyze the district court's decision in Planned
Parenthood and argue that, given the jurisprudence regarding FACE,
the Internet and the First Amendment, the jury decision should be
affirmed on appeal. Finally, it will conclude that evaluating the
context in which speech is made is both necessary and relevant to a
court's evaluation of an "as-applied" First Amendment challenge to
speech regulation.
I. The Nuremberg Files: A Brief Description of the
Controversy
The Web site in controversy, entitled The Nuremberg Files,17 lists
15. As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to a case that
challenged FACE as violating the First Amendment. I will, however, examine cases in
which the Supreme Court has inspected issues similar to those arising in the FACE
context: Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (1994), and Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
16. 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding several sections of the 1996 Communications
Decency Act in violation of the First Amendment).
17. This site can be found at <http:lwww.xs4all.nll-oracle/nuremberglgate.html>
(visited September 13, 1999), which is a "mirror site" posted by Karin Spaink of
Amsterdam, a free speech advocate. The site was formerly found at
<http://www.christiangallery.comlatrocity>. Two days after the jury verdict, MindSpring,
the Web site's Internet service provider, terminated the site for violating its "appropriate-
use policy" which provides that "threats of bodily harm of destruction of property are
always prohibited." David Hudson, Internet Service Provider Pulls Plug on Nuremberg
Files, FREE! THE FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE, Feb. 5, 1999
<http:llwww.freedomforum.orglspeech/1999/2/5abortion.asp>. MindSpring's appropriate
use policy can be found at <http:llmindspring.netlaboutms/policy.html> (visited Feb. 23,
1999).
Not long after MindSpring pulled The Nuremberg Files, the site's operators succeeded
in locating a new host for the site. See Pamela Mendels, Anti-Abortion Site is Back Online,
N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Feb. 22, 1999 (visited Feb. 23, 1999)
<http:lnytimes.comllibrary/tech>.
The district court issued a permanent injunction on March 16, 1999 which has
prevented Neal Horsley, the site's operator, from re-posting the original site. See Planned
Parenthood 1H, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1154, (D. Or. 1999).
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the names and addresses (sometimes including both home and work
addresses) of many abortion physicians (whom the site refers to as
"baby butchers") and other clinic personnel.18 For a few physicians,
other information is also listed, including license plate numbers and
the names of children. The site's operator has crossed off the names
of four doctors and two clinic workers killed since 1993 "like items
on a grocery list."' 9 The list's legend further elaborates: "Black font
(working); Grayed-out name (wounded); Strikethrough (fatality)."20
Furthermore, among those listed as having committed "crimes against
humanity" are federal judges, law enforcement personnel and
outspoken pro-choice celebrities.21 The site's electronic pages are
adorned by dripping blood and severed baby arms and legs, with a
headline that proclaims: "Abortionists: the baby butchers." 2
The Nuremberg Files and its operator, Neal Horsley,23 a Georgia
computer programmer, gained media attention shortly after the
October 1998 sniper shooting of Dr. Barnett Slepian, a Buffalo, New
York abortion physician.24 Dr. Slepian's name was crossed off the list
soon after his murder, leaving many to wonder whether a connection
existed between those who operated the site and those who
committed the killing.25 Horsley claimed, however, that the site is
merely used to collect evidence on abortion doctors in the hopes that
if abortion is outlawed, these doctors will be put on trial like the Nazi
18. See Associated Press, Jury Being Picked for Anti-Abortion Web Site Trial, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 8, 1999, at 18, available in 1999 WL 2832939.
19. Hans Griemel, Court to Consider if Anti-Abortion Web Site Goes Too Far,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 8, 1999, at 3, available in 1999 WL 7650602.
20. See Paul McMasters, Nuremberg Files Anti-Abortion Site: Free Speech Or Hit
List?, FREE! THE FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE, Jan. 19, 1999 (visited Feb. 9, 1999)
<http:/lwww.freedomforum.org/first/1999//119ombudsman.asp>.
21. The Nuremberg Files, <http://www.christiangallery.comlatrocity> (visited February
23, 1999, before the March 16, 1999 injunction issued). See Planned Parenthood I1, 41 F.
Supp. 2d at 1130).
22. See The Nuremberg Files, supra note 21.
23. Neal Horsley is not a defendant in the Planned Parenthood case. The
organizational defendant, American Coalition of Life Activists, was involved in the
creation of the hard copy version of the Nuremberg Files. The ACLA enlisted the
assistance of Neal Horsley to publish this information on the Internet. See Planned
Parenthood 111, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1133-34; see also id. at 1152 ("Neal Horsley is an agent of
defendants ACLA, Michael Bray, Andrew Burnett, David Crane and Charles Wysong.").
24. See, e.g., Carol Ness, More Abortion Violence is Feared in Light of Trophy List on
Foes' Internet Site, THE DET. NEWS, Nov. 15, 1990 (describing the site's practice of
crossing out names of those killed).
25. See Associated Press, Jury to be Selected in Suit Against Antiabortion Web Site,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7, 1999, at All, available in 1999 WL 6042338 (quoting a
Portland physician, Dr. Ray Guggenhein, who stated: "You can see the doctors they've
crossed off. You tell me, is that free speech or intimidation?").
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war criminals of Nuremberg. 26 In response to questions regarding the
practice of crossing out names, Horsley stated that these categories
are meant to show that "the legalized war of abortion is leading to a
crescendo of domestic terrorism. When I scratch out a name, I'm
saying 'I told you so."'27 In an interview just prior to Dr. Slepian's
murder, Horsley responded to questioning regarding how he would
feel if a murderer used his site to pick a victim, by stating, "I wouldn't
be surprised. The situation we're looking at inevitably incites certain
people to take the lives of those who are killing children." 28
H. The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994:
Congress Reacts to Anti-Abortion Violence
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act29 was signed into
law on May 26, 1994. The act attaches both criminal penalties30 and
civil liability3' to activities by persons who use force, threat of force or
physically obstruct persons obtaining or providing reproductive
health services.32 Additionally, the law prohibits use of force, threat
of force or physical obstruction aimed at preventing persons from
"lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right
of religious freedom at a place of worship. ' 33 Finally, the law targets
conduct aimed at property destruction of either a facility providing
reproductive health services or a place of religious worship.
34
A. The Context of Violence Prior and Subsequent to FACE's Enactment
Congress described FACE's purpose as "protect[ing] and
promot[ing] the public safety and health and activities affecting
interstate commerce. '35 Senate findings made during consideration
of FACE include determinations that the "methods used to deny
women access to [abortion-related services] include blockades of
26. See Hans Griemel, Trial to Examine Whether Anti-Abortion Web Site is Pro-
Violence or Free Speech, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 7, 1999, at 4, available in
1999 WL 6210624.
27. See David Rovella, Site Author Notes When Pro-Choice Doctors Become Fatalities.
Are Judges Next?, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 23,1998, at A6.
28. See Jennifer Gonnerman, The Terrorist Campaign Against Abortion, THE
VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 10, 1990, at 36, available in 1998 WL 20493298.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1998); Pub. L. No. 103-259; 108 Stat. 694.
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b) (1998) (imposing fines, imprisonment, or both for
violations, with increasing penalties for repeat offenders).
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(c) (1998) (civil remedies include injunctive relief and
compensatory and punitive damages).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1998).
33. Id. § 248(a)(2) (1998).
34. See id. at § 248(a)(3) (1998).
35. § 2 of Pub. L. No. 103-259 (1994).
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facility entrances; invasions and occupations of the premises;
vandalism and destruction of property in and around the facility;
bombings, arson and murder; and other acts of force and threats of
force. '36  Indeed, between 1977 and 1993, reproductive health
providers reported over 1,000 violent acts and over 6,000 clinic
blockades.37 In particular, there have been 154 arson incidents, 39
bombings, and 99 acid attacks against abortion providers.3 8 Amidst
this culture of violence, and because of the Supreme Court's decision
in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,39 Congress passed and
the President signed FACE into law.4°
FACE has been partially successful in reducing the level of
violence directed at clinics. 41 Overall clinic violence, including bomb
threats, arson, death threats and stalking, still plagues approximately
25% of clinics, with this figure down from approximately 52% of
clinics in 1994.42 The most common forms of violence and
intimidation tactics reported by clinics were bomb threats and
vandalism.43 Though the overall percentage of clinics reporting
violence has decreased, in 1997 the percentage of clinics reporting
certain tactics, including arson threats, bomb threats and gunfire,
actually increased.44 Moreover, although overall clinic violence
decreased, staff resignations resulting from the atmosphere of
violence increased from 4% in 1996 to just over 7% in 1997,45
bringing to the forefront the impact of anti-abortion violence and the
corresponding necessity of FACE in preserving Roe v. Wade's46
meaningfulness and protecting the right to obtain an abortion.
36. 139 CONG. REC. S15,656-65 (1993).
37. See Kristine L. Sendek, 'Face'-ing the Constitution: The Battle Over the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Shifts from Reproductive Health Facilities to the Federal Courts,
46 CATH. U. L. REV. 165,166 (1996) (citing S. REP. No. 103-117, at 3 (1993)).
38. See Gonnerman, supra note 28. This article also describes the effects of this wave
of violence on abortion provision: increased security expenses for clinics and a decrease in
provider numbers, which combine to reduce women's access to abortion services. See id.
39. 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (holding that the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, was
inapplicable to victims of clinic violence, because women were not a "class" for the
purposes of the Act and the actions of anti-abortion protestors do not prohibit women
from exercising their rights). See Bray, 506 U.S. at 274-79.
40. See 139 CONG. REC. S15,656-65 (1993).
41. See Feminist Majority Foundation, Key Findings, 1997 CLINIC VIOLENCE SURVEY
REPORT (visited 2/23/99) <http://www.feminist.org/research/cvsurveys/1997/Cvsurvey2.
html> (hereinafter Feminist Findings).
42. See id.
43. See Feminist Majority Foundation, Results, 1997 CLINIC VIOLENCE SURVEY
REPORT (visited 2/23/99) <http://www.feminist.org/research/cvsurveys/1997/cvsurvey5.
html> (hereinafter Feminist Results).
44. See id.
45. See Feminist Findings, supra note 41.
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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B. FACE Survives Constitutional Scrutiny
FACE has withstood numerous constitutional challenges since its
enactment.47 The challenges generally fall into three categories: (1)
FACE exceeds Congress' Commerce power;48 (2) FACE is both
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague;49 and (3) FACE, as applied,
violates the First Amendment freedom of speech.50
Several courts that have addressed First Amendment challenges
to FACE have concluded that FACE is content-neutral legislation
because it does not regulate speech or conduct "based on hostility or
favoritism towards the underlying message expressed."51 Thus, these
courts apply intermediate scrutiny.52 Further, although the majority
of those punished under the statute are anti-abortion protesters and
activists,53 more than one court has noted that "there is, after all, no
disparate impact theory in First Amendment law."'54 In addition,
FACE seeks to prohibit three types of activity: use of force, threats
of force and physical obstruction-activities which have been deemed
unprotected by the First Amendment.55
Courts do not stop with these observations, however. They also
recognize that enforcement of the Act could lead to incidental effects
47. For a discussion arguing that FACE is unconstitutional as violating the First
Amendment, see Jill W. Rose and Chris Osborn, Note, Face-ial Neutrality: A Free Speech
Challenge to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 81 VA. L. REv. 1505 (1995)
(arguing that FACE is a content-based regulation of speech that fails to survive strict
scrutiny) and Katherine Hilber, Constitutional Face-off. Testing the Validity of the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 143 (1994)
(contending that FACE fails because the government does not have a sufficiently
independent interest in protecting the health and safety of women seeking abortions and
that the Act is vague and overbroad).
48. See, e.g., Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that FACE
was within Congress' commerce power); see also American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d
642, 647 (4th Cir. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995). But see
United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (stating that FACE exceeded
Congress' power under the commerce clause), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 683-84 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that FACE was neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor void for vagueness).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 922-26 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
both that FACE passed intermediate scrutiny and that defendant's statements constituted
threats in violation of FACE).
51. United States v. Wilson, 154 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)); see also United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292, 296 (2d
Cir. 1998).
52. See, e.g., Terry, 101 F.3d at 1419; Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923.
53. The first case in which FACE was used to hold a pro-choice activist liable was
Greenhut v. Hand, 996 F. Supp. 372 (D.NJ 1998).
54. Terry, 101 F.3d at 1419-1420 (quoting Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923).
55. See, e.g., Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921; American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642,
647 (4th Cir. 1995).
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on protected expressive conduct or speech. 56 For instance, both the
Dinwiddie and American Life League courts applied the test
contained in United States v. O'Brien,57 which provides that a statute
regulating expressive conduct passes intermediate First Amendment
scrutiny if it "furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. '58 Noting that the governmental interest
in "protecting women who obtain reproductive health services and
ensuring that reproductive-health services remain available" is both
substantial and unrelated to restriction of free speech 9 and that the
incidental restriction is "no greater than required to meet the
government's interests" as the Act "leaves open ample means for
alternative communication," 6 both the Fourth and the Eighth
Circuits upheld FACE as constitutional. 61
Although those circuit courts that have addressed FACE have
found that it passes constitutional muster, these "as applied"
challenges do not provide sufficient guidance for concluding that
Planned Parenthood's outcome was constitutionally sound. As courts
have pointed out, the Act targets unprotected conduct, and any
incidental effects on free speech are tied to a substantial government
interest. This conclusion, however, does not preclude further
constitutional investigation of the Act applied to other circumstances.
Cases where constitutional challenges have been unsuccessful involve
physical obstruction of a clinic entrance 62 and direct person-to-person
threats.63 Planned Parenthood presents a case of first impression in
that neither of these circumstances are present. Instead, the question
is whether the site's dissemination of personal information regarding
abortion providers over the Internet, accompanied by its method of
crossing off fatalities, can be considered a "threat of force [that]
intimidates."'64 If this site can be properly characterized as a threat of
56. See American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648; Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923.
57. 391 U.S. 367 (1968)(upholding a law that prohibited the destruction of draft cards
although this destruction signified opposition to the Vietnam War).
58. lId at 377.
59. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 924.
60. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652.
61. See supra notes 57, 58.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 154 F.3d 658, 658 (7th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Weslin, 155 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Kan.
1995).
63. See, e.g., Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913; United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667 (5th Cir.
1997).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1999).
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force, then FACE, as applied to this case, passes constitutional
scrutiny. This Note argues that, because the current climate of
violence directed at abortion providers was properly taken into
account by the district court, both the decision and FACE survive
constitutional examination.
C. The Supreme Court's Pre-FACE Abortion Protest Encounters
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.65 and Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network,65 the Supreme Court evaluated injunctions that
placed restrictions on anti-abortion demonstrations outside abortion
clinics to determine if the restrictions contained therein violated the
First Amendment. In both cases, the Court upheld certain provisions
of these injunctions, while striking down other provisions as
unconstitutional.
The injunction at issue in Madsen included a 36 foot buffer zone
that protected clinic entrances, as well as noise restrictions, a ban on
"images observable" from the clinic and a no-approach clause that
prevented protestors from approaching patients or staff "unless such
person indicates a desire to communicate." 67 The Madsen Court
announced a new test to scrutinize the injunction provisions for First
Amendment violations.68 In so doing, the Court rejected the standard
"time, place, and manner" analysis of regulation of a traditionally
public forum as not being sufficiently rigorous because here an
injunction affecting speech was at issue, not a statute; injunctions are
more rigorously scrutinized to ensure that its terms "fit" its
objectives.69 Instead, the Court asked if the challenged provisions
burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant
governmental purpose.70 Applying this new standard, the Court first
found that several government interests, including protecting a
woman's freedom to seek lawful medical services, protecting property
rights, and ensuring the public safety and order, were significant
enough to support at least an "appropriately tailored injunction." 71
After examining the specific provisions of the injunction, the Court
held that the 36 foot buffer zone and the noise restriction "burdened
no more speech than necessary to protect access to the clinic," while it
struck down the "no-approach" and the "images observable"
65. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
66. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
67. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759-60 & n.1.
68. Id. at 765.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 765.
71. Id. at 767-68.
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provisions as too burdensome.72
Subsequently, Schenck applied the Madsen test to uphold a 15
foot "fixed" buffer zone, while striking down a 15 foot "floating"
buffer zone, which would prevent protesters from coming within 15
feet of any clinic staff or patient as they approached the clinic.73 The
Court noted that the floating buffer zone prohibits too much speech,
proscribing a wide spectrum of conduct from harassment to mere
"leafleting and commenting." 74 In other words, the floating zone
leaves the peaceful protester with insufficient knowledge about how
to remain in compliance with the injunction.
While recognizing, in both cases, the government's interest in
ensuring access to clinic entrances for clinic patients and staff, the
Court proceeded cautiously in its First Amendment inquiries. The
analyses regarding these injunctions provide a sound prediction of the
constitutionality regarding the "physical obstruction" portion of the
FACE prohibitions, yet these decisions leave inadequate guidance for
the "threat of force that intimidates" section, especially as applied to
The Nuremberg Files. Although the Court failed to state explicitly
that protecting the right to abortion was significant enough to warrant
some limitations on speech or expressive conduct (because the
constitutional right at stake here prevents states from unduly
burdening access to abortion services, not private actors), the Court
did recognize as significant other governmental interests, such as
ensuring access to clinic entrances and promotion of public safety.
H1. Internet Regulation and the First Amendment
What has become known as the "Internet" is an "intangible
infrastructure of networks" that can be used for communication in
versatile ways.75 Among the most common uses are electronic mail,
real-time communication, and "remote information retrieval. 76
Remote information retrieval is generally achieved using the "World
Wide Web," where users can access a wide array of information.77
The Web's information is commonly contained in documents known
as Web pages or sites, and each has its own unique address. 78 Often, a
site contains "links" to other pages or sites that may be related to the
72. Id. at 768-75.
73. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357,377-79 (1997).
74. Id. at 358.
75. Angela E. Wu, Spinning a Tighter Web: The First Amendment and Internet
Regulation, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 263,268 (1997).
76. Id. at 269-70.
77. See id. at 270.
78. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,851-52 (1997).
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information contained in the original site.79 Use of this technology is
increasing and is expected to continue to increase due, in part, to its
varied capabilities, low-cost and accessibility 0
This new communication medium had gone largely unregulated8l
until the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 199682 was enacted
in response to a growing concern over the availability of sexually
explicit material on the Internet.83 The CDA made it a felony to
transmit knowingly to recipients under 18 years of age "obscene or
indecent" material84 and to send "patently offensive" messages in a
manner available to persons under 18 years of age, regardless of
whether the speech was directed at minors.85 The same day that
President Clinton signed the CDA, the first constitutional challenge
to the act was filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 6  The three judge panel granted a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the CDA, holding that it was
unconstitutionally overbroad and was not narrowly tailored to
achieve what the court considered to be a compelling government
interest of preventing minors' exposure to psychologically harmful
materials.87  Following the CDA's explicit expedited review
procedures, the Government appealed the injunction decision directly
to the Supreme Court,88 who accepted the case for review.89
A. Reno v. ACLU: The Supreme Court Confronts the Internet
As is generally true when addressing the constitutionality of
government regulation of mass communication, the Supreme Court
applied a "medium-specific" analysis to the CDA.90 Facing an
Internet regulation for the very first time, the Supreme Court was
confronted with the question of how to categorize the Internet.
79. See id.
80. See Wu, supra note 75, at 271.
81. See Stephen C. Jacques, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Interne4 the First
Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1945, 1965-68 (1997)
(describing the opinion held by many, that the success of the Internet lies in its
decentralized nature, and that existing laws are sufficient to combat any illegal Internet
activities).
82. Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h)).
83. See Michael Johns, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: Trying to Teach Old
Doctrines New Tricks, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 1383,1405 (1996).
84. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1997).
85. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1997).
86. See Jacques, supra note 81, at 1974.
87. See id. at 1975-78 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,948 (1996)).
88. See id at 1978, n.181.
89. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
90. See id. at 868-70.
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Should it be likened to print media (thus warranting strict scrutiny of
the regulation) or is it more similar to broadcast media (thus allowing
the government more latitude in content regulation)? 91  After
concluding that the Internet did not share the characteristics of
broadcast media, the Court held that Internet regulation was subject
to strict scrutiny.92 The Court then held that the CDA "lacked the
precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates
the content of speech," pointing to the statute's suppression of speech
addressed to adults, seen where transmissions sent in a "manner that
is available to persons under 18 years of age" are prohibited
regardless of the intended audience,93 as being too broad to further its
purpose of denying minors' access to potentially harmful speech.94
From the Court's first foray into addressing Internet regulation,
one can infer a willingness to grant strong constitutional protection to
this medium. As one scholar has noted, the Internet comes closest to
the Holmesian ideal of the "marketplace of ideas" by breaking down
some of the barriers to disseminating one's views.95 With this
sentiment, any regulation of the Internet will be subject to intense
examination to ensure that there is no suppression of ideas. There is
no doubt that the district court decision in Planned Parenthood and
its application of FACE, concluding that The Nuremberg Files Web
site amounts to a threat properly prohibited under FACE, will be
carefully reviewed to safeguard free expression in this new
marketplace.
B. The Difficult Task of Defining Internet Threats
In United States v. Alkhabaz,96 the Sixth Circuit addressed the
issue of Internet threats. The defendant, known as Jake Baker, was a
University of Michigan student charged with violating the federal
general threat statute97 by communicating over electronic mail ("e-
91. See Jacques, supra note 81, at 1980.
92. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (finding that the Internet (1) did not have a history
of government regulation; (2) was not a "scarce" expressive commodity; and (3) is not as
invasive as radio or television and thus holding that previous cases "provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied").
93. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1). See also David Djavaherian, Reno v. ACLU, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 371, 373 (1998) (pointing out that violation of this "patently offensive"
provision of the CDA occurs regardless of the intended audience).
94. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874 (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727,759 (1996)).
95. See Jacques, supra note 81, at 1988-89 (arguing that the Internet "embodies the
essence of democracy: equal participation").
96. 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994), which states "whoever transmits in interstate or
foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
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mail") a desire to inflict sexual torture, rape and murder on young
girls.98 Baker had originally come to the attention of University of
Michigan officials through a short story he posted to an Internet site,
entitled "Pamela's Ordeal," in which the narrator engages in rape,
torture and mutilation of a female student.99 Because the name of the
story's female student matched the name of one of Baker's
classmates, the University conducted an investigation that revealed
those e-mail communications which became the subject of the
criminal litigation.1°°
In its opinion, the district court noted the vast capabilities of the
Internet as a tool for communication stating that:
The Internet makes it possible with unprecedented ease to achieve
world-wide distribution of material... posted to its public areas.
When used in such a fashion, the Internet may be likened to a
newspaper with unlimited distribution and no locatable printing
press-and with no supervising editorial control.10 1
The court ultimately granted Baker's motion to quash the indictment,
emphasizing that these e-mail communications did not contain
sufficient specificity of targeted individuals to constitute "true
threats" under the Kelner02  standard, thereby rejecting the
government's argument that the targets were young girls in Baker's
neighborhood. 10 3 The court emphasized that Baker's communications
were contained in e-mail messages and not published publicly. Thus,
the true threat analysis for this new technology remained
undifferentiated from speech or printed words.1°4
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, but
on different grounds.105  Instead of examining the First
Amendment/true threat issue, the court chose to scrutinize the
requisite elements under the statute, and held that the government
failed to allege required facts including allegations that Baker made
the statement "for the purpose of furthering some goal through the
more than five years, or both."
98. See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997).
99. See Stephen J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry Into the Foundations
and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275,1277 (1998).
100. See id.
101. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375,1390 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
102- See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976) (elaborating on the
"true threat" standard of Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969): "so long as the threat
on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and
imminent prospect of execution, the statute may properly be applied"). For a discussion
of Kelner, see infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
103. See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1389.
104. See id. at 1390-91.
105. See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997).
January 2000] THE FREEDOM OF ACCESS
use of intimidation." 1°6 Reading such an intent requirement into the
statute appears to serve the purpose of narrowing the breadth of
alleged threats prohibited under the statute. As one scholar argued,
"the court's formal insistence that it was merely dismissing the
indictment for insufficiency cloaks a significant shift toward a more
vigilant policing of prosecutions under Section 875(c), informed by
First Amendment concerns."'1 7 Unlike the district court, the Sixth
Circuit failed to discuss the unique sphere at the center of this
particular case and its influence on the court's decision.108
Other publicized instances of alleged threats communicated via
e-mail include threats of sexual violence sent to a 12 year-old girl in
Indianapolis and threats of anti-Semitic violence sent to a school
teacher in Gloucester, Massachusetts. 1' 9 Showing the presence of
threats in these instances is somewhat easier, given the victim
specificity and the objectively clearer intent of the perpetrator to act
on his threats. 10
Thus, under the Baker jurisprudence, important elements of true
threats include target specificity, as well as manifestation of an intent
to act on the threats. The cases just described, however, include e-
mail situations that were addressed to specific individuals and never
meant for public consumption. As the district court in Baker noted,
the analysis may very well be different for those "publicly published"
threatening communications."'
C. Internet Regulation: Lessons from Reno v. ACLU and United States v.
Jake Baker
The widespread availability of sexually explicit materials that
spawned the passage of the CDA, as well as the e-mail
communications in United States v. Baker, are indicative of the
powerful nature of the Internet, both in terms of its vastness and its
ability to evoke strong reactions. As one writer observed, "the
Internet's primary purpose is to promote and facilitate the exchange
of ideas without regard for physical barriers and distance.""12 Many
argue that this is precisely why the Internet should not be
106. Id. at 1495.
107. Robert Kurman Kelner, United States v. Jake Baker: Revisiting Threats and the
First Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 287,312 (1998).
108. See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1492-93.
109. See Sally Greenberg, Threats, Harassment, and Hate On-Line: Recent
Developments, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 673, 682-84 (1997).
110. See id. at 685 (arguing that a court is more likely to find these instances to be "true
threats").
111. 890 F. Supp. 1375,1390-91 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
112. Wu, supra note 75, at 296.
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governmentally regulated at all." 3
Among the proposals for alternatives to government regulation
is self-regulation, which encompasses a wide variety of possibilities.
One self-regulatory technique is known as "flaming," a practice
dictating that when someone posts something offensive to others,
those offended respond by sending the poster a harsh message.
114 It
is far from clear, however, whether flaming by itself would prevent
the "hearty operator" from continuing the offensive and threatening
posting practices.
Another possibility for self-regulation entails empowering system
operators or moderators to monitor the postings and to sanction
offenders. 115 An example of such self-regulation has already been
observed with respect to The Nuremberg Files, where the original
service provider maintained an "appropriate use policy" which
contained a prohibition against threats and harassment.116 When the
provider deemed The Nuremberg Files to be in violation of its policy,
the site was ostensibly banished.117 This expulsion was short-lived
however-only a few days after service provider MindSpring "pulled
the plug" on The Nuremberg Files, an anonymous provider allowed
Horsley to repost." 8 This technique, at least in The Nuremberg Files
situation, has apparently backfired on the Internet service provider.
The site's operator, Neal Horsley, responded to MindSpring's
assertion of control over site content by filing a $250 million breach of
contract suit against the company, asserting that "corporations do not
have the right to act as police."" 19
Another option, noted by the Supreme Court in ACLU, is to
require the use of membership and passwords to enter certain sites as
a way to prevent the general public from accessing a site's contents.
20
The Court recognized, however, that widespread use of this type of
regulation would impose significant burdens on many sites.121 Indeed,
113. See id. (contending that the power of the Internet is in its unique attributes, such as
its ability to generate a "virtual community" with no geographical, temporal or physical
barriers). See also supra note 83, at 1423 (asserting that the Internet's power "should not
automatically lead to greater regulation").
114. See Johns, supra note 83, at 1423 (noting that flaming can also include harsh
measures such as including a virus with the message). See also Wu, supra note 75, at 301-
02.
115. See id.
116. See Hudson, supra note 17.
117. See id.
118. See Mendels, supra note 17.
119. Lawrence Viele, MindSpring Sued for Bouncing Anti-Abortion Site Off Web, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 11, 1999, at 4.
120. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 856-57 (1997) (also noting that these devices are
not foolproof).
121. See id.
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extensive use of this type of control could severely limit the reach of
the Internet's communications, placing economic barriers (such as
requiring credit cards or driver's licenses) to access information.
Related to the password alternative is the use of filtering
software. This option puts the control over access to certain Internet
sites in the hands of the viewer. Filtering software, which is currently
available to consumers, is generally used by parents to regulate what
sites their children can view, and has become exceedingly popular
since the Columbine High School shooting.1 22 Additionally, there are
bills pending in Congress which, if passed, would require federally
funded schools and libraries to install this technology on computers
used by minors.123 This option, however, does not directly address the
problem of hate speech or online threats, because adults, in addition
to children, are just as vulnerable to these types of communications.
Yet another suggested Internet self-policing scheme is the use of
an international "Virtual Community Organization," whose mission
would be to establish virtual community standards. 124 Although such
a private group would not be subject to First Amendment limitations,
issues of enforceability would arise with the use of such a group.125
Without government sanction, it is unclear how one who violates the
standards established by a Virtual Community Organization could be
effectively restrained.
The Nuremberg Files presents a situation not fully addressed by
any one of these alternatives to government regulation. The
widespread accessibility of information on the Internet has been
touted as its most promising feature in promoting the marketplace of
ideas concept.126 When this tool is used to disseminate personal
information about individuals involved in abortion services, including
home addresses and information regarding children and spouses, at
the same time describing these individuals as "baby butchers," the
Internet's widespread availability becomes exactly the problem. A
self-regulatory policing scheme, for instance, seems inadequate to
address this issue, because the privacy concern may not be readily
apparent to site moderators, who themselves have political or
ideological biases. The practice of flaming seems altogether
insufficient because, as stated earlier, harsh messages will not prevent
the hearty operator from continuing the practice-and may even fuel
122. See Richard Raysman and Peter Brown, Extreme Speech on the Internet, N.Y.L.J.,
June 8, 1999, at 3.
123. See id.
124. See Wu, supra note 75, at 302.
125. See iL at 302-03 (arguing that this option would not be administratively
burdensome, because meetings could be accomplished online, and a VCO could be
effective if nations cooperated and abided by the standards set by such an organization).
126. See Jacques, supra note 81, at 1988-89.
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the site operator to continue with more gusto. 127 And, even if a site
were to be sanctioned with "exile," the site operator may simply
relocate to another service provider or be mirrored, as seen with The
Nuremberg Files.128 One option short of government regulation,
although perhaps somewhat puerile and likely only to be marginally
effective, is to counter such a site with a site that mirrors the tactics of
The Nuremberg Files: naming names and disseminating personal
information about "the other side." Additionally, this option
prompts the following question: would the "counter-posters" be
subject to liability under FACE?129 I would argue that liability would
unlikely attach because without the corresponding context of violence
against anti-abortion activists, such a list of "pro-life" membership
would not amount to a "hit list.' ' 30
As the Supreme Court recognized in Reno v. ACLU, the Internet
is indeed a medium worthy of First Amendment protection. 131 Even
with the need for protection of free speech in mind, however, some
regulation appears necessary to prevent the exploitation that is
inevitable with such a powerful medium. Although Internet abuses
may overlap with the misuse of other communication forms, the
Internet's vast capabilities and broad-based audience compound the
injury stemming from such abuses, which can include privacy
infringement, threats, and defamation, among others. Given the
unique attributes of the Internet, mere unquestioning application of
previously utilized doctrine may not be sufficient. As the district
court in United States v. Baker observed, "new technology such as the
Internet may complicate analysis and may sometimes require new or
127. See, e.g., Mark Howerter, The Other Side: Guestbook, (visited Jan 3, 2000)
<http:llwww.cris.com/-dhathaw/othersideguestview.sht>. This Web site describes itself as
too right wing for the news, containing articles espousing the Christian right views on
homosexuality, abortion, and other controversial topics. Howerter, the site operator,
includes a guestbook, where visitors to the site can comment. While many comments are
supportive of Howerter's ideology, many also sharply criticize his narrowminded views.
These "flames" have not, however, altered Howerter's site practices in any way. The
address to Howerter's general Web page is <http://www.otherside.net>. Neal Horsley had
also operated a Web site where he responded to critical, flaming e-mails by ridiculing the
e-mail authors for their "un-Christian" liberal views, which I have been unable to locate
post-injunction.
128. See Mendels, supra note 17.
129. Recall that FACE prohibits threats of those exercising religious freedom. See 18
U.S.C. § 248(a)(2) (1994) (prohibiting threatening, obstructing or interfering with any
person "lawfully exercising... the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place
of religious worship").
130. For a discussion regarding an assessment of current social and political
circumstances in the evaluation of threats, see infra Part V.
131. 521 U.S. 844, 862 (1997) (citing the opinion of the District Court in ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,883 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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modified laws."'132
IV. Applying Free Speech Clause Jurisprudence to Planned
Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists
The Supreme Court has articulated two nominally distinct, yet
analytically merged,133 doctrines of First Amendment analysis when
addressing speech that presents danger of lawless action: the
"incitement" doctrine, announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio,134 and the
"true threat" doctrine, announced in Watts v. United States.135 Under
these doctrines, both inciting and threatening speech are
constitutionally proscribable. Because the district court in Planned
Parenthood used the true threat doctrine in its decision and jury
instruction, this Note will examine The Nuremberg Files under this
doctrine. Additionally, FACE explicitly prohibits only actual force or
"threats of force."'1 36 This language appears to limit the Act's reach
and does not include words that incite others to "injure, intimidate or
interfere with" those persons providing reproductive healthcare.
Notwithstanding this apparent limitation, this Note will also examine
the Planned Parenthood decision usingincitement analysis, mindful
that the jury verdict is vulnerable on appeal because of the admittedly
lenient true threat standard used. Incitement may provide an
additional basis for such regulation.
In addition, recent First Amendment cases decided by the
Supreme Court137 involving hate speech legislation will also be
examined. Although Planned Parenthood presents distinct issues
from hate speech legislation, which is more related to the fighting
words doctrine, it is constructive to draw parallels between the two,
especially in light of recent national attention given to "extreme
speech" on the Internet.138 The Nuremberg Files certainly does
espouse hatred for those who are committed to ensuring the
availability of the full spectrum of reproductive health services, and in
this way its regulation is similar to hate speech legislation.
132. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375,1390 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
133. See Kelner, supra note 107, at 289 (arguing that the line between "threats" and
"incitement" is "ill-defined").
134. 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969).
135. 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a).
137. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476 (1993).
138. See, e.g., Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Extreme Speech on the Internet,
N.Y.LJ., June 8, 1999, at 3 (linking on-line threats and Web sites "dedicated to violence
and hatred" with estimates of the number of "hate sites" ranging from 250 to 1,400).
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A. Incitement: Brandenburg v. Ohio and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co.139
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court reversed a
conviction under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism statute on First
Amendment grounds.14° The defendant, a member of the Ku Klux
Klan, stated in a rally speech, "if our President, our Congress, our
Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's
possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken."' 41
The Supreme Court held the syndicalism act unconstitutional because
it failed to distinguish between "mere advocacy" and "incitement to
imminent lawless action."'142 The Court required that, in order to fall
outside of First Amendment protection, advocacy must be "directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and [be] likely to
incite or produce such action." 143
Employing the Brandenburg test in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., the Supreme Court concluded that speeches made by
Charles Evers, NAACP Mississippi Field Secretary, which advocated
boycotting white merchants and included strong admonitions to those
who failed to support the boycott, were protected by the First
Amendment.144 The merchants had sued the NAACP as well as
several individuals for damages to business revenues resulting from
the boycott, and for an injunction to prohibit further boycott
activity.145 The lower court imposed liability on the defendants, in
part due to finding that Evers' speeches advocated or threatened
violent retribution to those who failed to follow the boycott.146 Evers
stated: "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores,
we're gonna break your damn neck."'147 The Court, while noting that
Evers' speech was "impassioned" and "emotionally charged," held
that the language did not rise to the level of incitement as described
in Brandenburg.148 The Court pointed out that the speeches did not
result in imminent lawless action (although there was violence
surrounding the boycott) and stated that "[a]n advocate must be free
to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for
139. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
140. 395 U.S. 444,449 (1969).
141. Id. at 446.
142. Id. at 448-49.
143. Id. at 447.
144. 458 U.S. at 928.
145. See id. at 889.
146. See id. at 901-03.
147. Id. at 902.
148. Id. at 928.
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unity and action in a common cause.' 49 Although the Court
acknowledged that Evers' statements could be categorized as
potential threats, the Court failed to analyze the statements under the
"true threat" doctrine. 150 This choice may be due to the political
context of these statements and the public forum in which they were
made.15'
B. True Threats: Watts v. United States and Its Progeny
In Watts v. United States, the defendant was convicted of
violating a federal law prohibiting threats against the President, when
he stated at an anti-war rally: "If they ever make me carry a rifle the
first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.' 52 Watts argued that the
statement could not be taken as a threat, given the context of a
political rally and the audience's reaction of laughter. 153  The
Supreme Court, while upholding the constitutional validity of the
statute, reversed the conviction, explaining that to succeed in a
conviction under this statute the Government must prove a "true
'threat,"' as distinguished from "political hyperbole.' 54 Here, the
Court agreed with Watts, who reasoned that he had engaged merely
in a "crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the
President."' 55 The Court recognized three factors as important in the
determination of a true threat: (1) the context of the statement; (2)
the statement's expressly conditional nature; and (3) the reaction of
the listeners. 56
The Second Circuit elaborated on the true threat standard in
upholding the conviction of the defendant in United States v.
Kelner.157 Russell Kelner, a member of the Jewish Defense League
("J.D.L."), was convicted for violating the federal general purpose
anti-threat statute 58 when, in a press conference, he stated that the
J.D.L. was planning to assassinate Yasser Arafat.159 In appealing his
conviction, Kelner claimed, among other things, that his statements
were not "true threats" because he had no intention of actually using
force; rather, the statements were, like Watts' statements, "political
149. Id.
150. Id. at 928-29. For a discussion of the true threat doctrine, see infra part IV.B.
151. See Kelner, supra note 107, at 302 (quoting the Court's opinion in Claiborne, which
stated that analyzing political rhetoric requires extreme care).
152. 394 U.S. 705,706 (1969).
153. See id. at 707.
154. Id. at 708.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. 534 F.2d 1020,1025-28 (2d Cir. 1976).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
159. See Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1021.
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hyperbole."'16 Moreover, Kelner argued not only must the threat be
unambiguous, but that there must be evidence of specific intent on his
part to carry out the threat.' 61 The Second Circuit rejected this
argument, stating that the statute required only an intent to
communicate the threat, not to carry it out.162 The court construed
the term "threat," as contained in the statute, narrowly: a threat is
actionable if "on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made
[it] is ... so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to
the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and
imminent prospect of execution."'163
The Ninth Circuit formulated its own true threat analysis in Roy
v. United States 64 and Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist' 65 In Roy, a
case considering the same statute involved in Watts, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's conviction of Albert Roy, a United States
Marine stationed at Camp Pendleton, for threatening the President,
who was due to visit the next day. 66 The court rejected any
requirement of specific intent, and thus defined a threat as a
statement made intentionally "in a context or under such
circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the
statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily harm."'167 This test embodies what is referred to in
Planned Parenthood as the "objective speaker-based test" for
determining true threats. 68
The Lovell court followed this objective test and concluded that
Susan Lovell had threatened a guidance counselor when she told her,
"if you don't give me this schedule change, I'm going to shoot you."'
1 69
The court, implicitly acknowledging the importance of context,
pointed to the trend of increasing violence in schools, and found that
the guidance counselor and the school were justified in taking
Lovell's statements seriously. 70 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court, which had found that the school violated
Lowell's First Amendment rights when it suspended her for making
160. Id. at 1022.
161. See id. at 1024.
162. See id. at 1027.
163. Id.
164. 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969).
165. 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996).
166. Roy, 416 F.2d at 878.
167. Id. at 877.
168. Planned Parenthood I, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1191 (D. Or. 1998).
169. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372.
170. See id.
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the statement at issue.171
In true threat inquiries, the federal circuit courts have examined
the "mens rea" required for a conviction under one of the threat
statutes.172 In Kelner, the court rejected the defendant's argument
that there must be specific intent to carry out the threat, instead, it
only required the government to show that the defendant had a
"specific intent to communicate a threat to injure."173 In contrast, the
Alkhabaz court held that the intent requirement included a showing
that the defendant made the statement "for the purpose of furthering
some goal through the use of intimidation."' 74 Thus, confusion over
the intent requirements in these types of statutes remains: Must there
be intent to carry out violence, or merely intent to threaten? This
distinction is important in the Planned Parenthood case, because it is
conceivable that the site's operator and the organization that assisted
in compiling and disseminating the information never intended to
carry out violent acts himself, but did intend to threaten and instill
fear in those listed.
Additionally, courts have inquired into the social and political
climate when evaluating the context of the threat. The Lovell court
explicitly examined the total circumstances, including current events,
when evaluating allegedly threatening statements. 175  Such an
endeavor had perhaps been implicit in the Ninth Circuit's affirmation
of the conviction in Roy, where the defendant's threats against the
President were made only four years after the Kennedy
assassination. 76 Additionally, the Watts result was likely affected by
the political circumstances of the day, widespread protests of the
United States' involvement in Vietnam War. 77 In light of these
considerations, the court in Planned Parenthood, then, was eminently
justified in explicitly referring to the recent shootings of abortion
providers in deciding to deny the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and allowing the case to be brought before a jury.178
C. Hate Speech and Fighting Words: R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul 79 and
Wisconsin v. Mitchell 80
The so-called fighting words doctrine originated in 1942 with the
171. See id. at 368-69.
172. See Kelner, supra note 107, at 289.
173. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020,1023 (2d Cir. 1976).
174. United States v. Alkhabaz 104 F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th Cir. 1997).
175. 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996).
176. 416 F.2d 874,875 (9th Cir. 1969).
177. See id.
178. See Planned Parenthood 11, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (D. Or. 1998).
179. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
180. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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Supreme Court's Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire8' decision. The
Court unanimously upheld the conviction of Chaplinsky, who
violated a New Hampshire statute making it a crime to "address any
offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is
lawfully in any street or other public place."'182 The Court declared
that "insulting or fighting words," defined as "those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace," fell outside of First Amendment protection. 83 Thus,
those words which can be characterized as "verbal violence" lead to
breaches of the peace as a result of the listener's reaction. 84
Hate speech refers to "expression that abuses or degrades others
on the basis of such traits as race, ethnicity, gender and religion.' 85
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul explains and limits the current status of the
hate speech (and thus, fighting words) doctrine. In R.A.V., the
Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul ordinance which prohibited
bias-motivated conduct that "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.' 86 The
Court found that the ordinance constituted a content-based
restriction on speech or expressive conduct, which is presumptively
invalid; and, in doing so, declined to hold that the fighting words
doctrine saved the ordinance from unconstitutionality.187 The Court
declared, "the reason why fighting words are categorically excluded
from the protection of the First Amendment is not that their content
communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a
particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing
whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey."'18 Thus, because the St.
Paul ordinance did not target the mode of expression, but instead
targeted the ideas of the expression, it was an invalid restriction of
speech.189 Following this reasoning, had St. Paul targeted threats
instead, these actions would be proscribable because the threat
"serves no purpose in the communication of the idea."'19
One year later, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Court addressed a
Wisconsin statute which provided enhanced penalties for crimes
181. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
182. Id. at 569.
183. Id. at 571-72.
184. See Heyman, supra note 99, at 1371.
185. Id. at 1375.
186. 505 U.S. 377,380 (1992) (citing St. Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
187. See id. at 391-95.
188. Id. at 393.
189. See id. at 393-94.
190. Richard J. Williams Jr., Burning Crosses and Blazing Words: Hate Speech and the
Supreme Court's Free Speech Clause Jurisprudence, 5 SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 609, 642
(1995).
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where victims were selected based on race.191 The Court upheld the
constitutionality of this statute, explaining that the statute punishes
criminal conduct not protected by the First Amendment, and that the
statute only required an examination of the defendant's motive in
committing this particular crime. 92 Deferring to the state's purpose
of deterring racially motivated criminal acts in enacting the statute,
the Court held that "[t]he First Amendment... does not prohibit the
evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to
prove motive or intent."' 93
These two recent cases reveal that the fighting words doctrine is
of limited use in regulating speech, unless it can be shown that the
speech is of a "socially unnecessary mode" and that the regulation is
not content or viewpoint based. If a regulation targeted threats of
violence or intimidation (which is arguably a socially unnecessary
mode or expression), is it permissible, under R.A.V. and Mitchell, to
specify one particular group of people as targets and criminalize only
threats toward that group? R.A.V. itself answers this question: "the
Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence
that are directed against the President,... since the reasons why
threats of violence are outside [the protection of] the First
Amendment ... have special force when applied to the person of the
President."' 94 This reasoning can be extended to threats against
reproductive health care providers, because a woman's constitutional
right to reproductive choice is at stake. This proposition answers the
question of FACE's constitutionality, but still fails to answer
adequately the precise issue in Planned Parenthood: Can The
Nuremberg Files, which only becomes threatening when the full
context of anti-abortion violence is considered, be prohibited as a
threat under FACE? Also, can The Nuremberg Files be regulated as
hate speech or fighting words?
D. Analyzing Planned Parenthood: Where Does It Fit?
This section considers the true threat analysis in the Planned
Parenthood case. Following the true threat discussion, this section
will examine the applicability and utility of other speech regulation
doctrines, specifically, incitement and fighting words.
(1) True Threats
In order for the Planned Parenthood plaintiffs to have succeeded
on their FACE claim, they needed to show that The Nuremberg Files
191. 508 U.S. 476,480(1993).
192. See id. at 484-87.
193. Id. at 489.
194. 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
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constituted "'threats of force' that intentionally 'intimidate' (defined
in FACE to mean 'to place a person in reasonable apprehension of
bodily harm') a person from providing reproductive health
services."' 95 The viability of this claim is dependent upon whether the
statements contained in The Nuremberg Files are protected speech or
unprotected true threats.196 This determination, however, depends on
which legal standard is used. Assessing the nature of The Nuremberg
Files' communication requires a look at two sources: (1) FACE cases
that utilize a true threat analysis; and (2) Internet threat cases.
In United States v. Dinwiddie, the Eighth Circuit scrutinized the
defendant's statements under a true threat standard to determine the
existence of a FACE violation.197 Dinwiddie made approximately 50
comments to Dr. Crist, an abortion provider, including "Robert,
remember Dr. Gunn .... This could happen to you .... He is not in
the world anymore.' 98 The Eighth Circuit used several factors to
determine the existence of a true threat, including: (1) the reaction of
the recipient; (2) whether the threat was conditional; (3) whether the
threat was communicated directly to its victim; (4) whether there was
a history of similar statements to the victim; and (5) whether the
victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a
propensity to engage in violence. 199 The court conceded, however,
that the list was neither exhaustive nor was the absence of any factor
dispositive.2°° In upholding Dinwiddie's conviction, the court also
observed that it was "appropriate for the District Court to consider
Crist's 'awareness of Dinwiddie's well-publicized advocacy of lethal
force."' 201 Further, the court noted that the reaction of Dr. Crist to
these threats was not that of laughter, unlike the audience in Watts.
Instead, he started wearing a bullet-proof vest.2°
In Lucero v. Trosch, however, a court in the Southern District of
Alabama held that the defendant's statements on a national television
show on which the plaintiff also appeared did not constitute a true
threat.20 3 The defendant, a priest who is an "outspoken advocate of
what is known as the 'doctrine of justifiable homicide,"' appeared as a
guest with the plaintiff on the Geraldo Show in 1994.204 During the
195. Planned Parenthood 11, 23 F. Supp. 2d. 1182, 1188 (D. Or. 1998) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
248(a)(1)).
196. See id. at 1188-89.
197. 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996).
198. Id.
199. See id. (citations omitted).
200. See id.
201. Id. at 926 n.10.
202. See id. at 926.
203. See Lucero v. Trosch, 928 F. Supp. 1124,1124 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
204. Id. at 1125-26.
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show, Father Trosch made the following statements in response to
questions by Geraldo: "I would not murder [an abortion doctor], but
I would kill him... [Dr. Lucero] is a mass murderer and he should be
dead. '205 Citing the Dinwiddie factors, the district court stated the
test for a "threat of force" in violation of FACE dictated that "the
nature of the statement must be gauged in light of the entire factual
context in which it was made. ' 2°6 Pointing to the chaotic nature of the
Geraldo Show, Geraldo's prodding of the defendant to announce his
views in a hostile manner, and the plaintiff's own decision to appear
on this show with the knowledge of defendant's presence, the court
held that these circumstances did not constitute a FACE violation,
and that the court could not conclude that, given these circumstances,
a reasonable person would construe the statements as a serious
intention to inflict bodily harm.207
The Planned Parenthood court looked to different precedent
altogether, but still employed a test similar to the Dinwiddie court
(although somewhat less demanding), declaring that an "objective
speaker-based test that considers all the circumstances" is the
appropriate examination to determine true threats.20 8 The objective
speaker-based test provides that a true threat exists where the
defendant intentionally makes a statement in a context where a
reasonable person would foresee an interpretation by the recipient as
a "serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm.' '2°9 This
test explicitly does not require that a statement be threatening on its
face-and looks to the entire context to determine if any statement
can be interpreted as a true threat.
The Baker court,210 however, used still different precedent to
make its determination that the sexually offensive e-mail messages
did not constitute true threats. The court cited the Kelner decision2 1
of the Second Circuit and adopted its test, which states that "[s]o long
as the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is
so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the
person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose[,]" application of
the statute is proper.2 2 This test is a much more stringent one than
either of the standards used in Dinwiddie, Lucero, or Planned
Parenthood. Given The Nuremberg Files' lack of a threat on its face,
205. Id. at 1127.
206. Id. at 1129 (emphasis added).
207. See id. at 1128-30.
208. Planned Parenthood 11, 23 F. Supp.2d 1182,1194 (D. Or. 1998).
209. Id. at 1192 (citing Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874,877-78 (9th Cir. 1969)).
210. See Part II.B. and accompanying notes for a discussion of Baker.
211. See discussion of United States v. Kelner, supra Part IV.B. and accompanying
notes.
212. See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1382.
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as conceded by the plaintiffs and recognized by the court, the true
threat claim would fail at the outset of an application of this more
stringent standard. Thus, the Planned Parenthood court implicitly
rejected the Kelner standard.213
Placing the three tests along a spectrum, then, the Planned
Parenthood/Roy standard is the most lenient, capturing the most
conduct, the Dinwiddie/Lucero test is an intermediate, and the Jake
BakeriKelner test is the most stringent. A court using the
Baker/Kelner standard, then, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that
the communication meets the exacting 'unequivocal threat on its face'
test to proscribe it. Because the jury found that The Nuremberg Files
was a true threat, they must have found the Roy test to be met-that
is, that The Nuremberg Files sufficed to make a reasonable person
foresee that its statements would be interpreted by those on the lists
to be a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm, particularly
given the context of abortion-related violence. Should an appellate
court hold that the correct definition of true threat was applied, the
Planned Parenthood verdict should stand. Those listed on the Web
site have ample reason to believe that the makers of the threat214 have
a propensity to engage in violence. The Planned Parenthood
defendants include people who have been outspoken in their
advocacy of violence to combat abortion providers.215 Thus, those
individuals listed on The Nuremberg Files are justified in feeling that
those responsible for the list would not hesitate to use force against
them.
Further, should the Ninth Circuit depart from its true threat
precedent, instead looking to the Dinwiddie court's interpretation of
FACE requirements, the decision will remain the same. Although
the Dinwiddie court acknowledged that the factors were neither all-
inclusive nor dispositive, an examination of these factors leads to a
finding that The Nuremberg Files constitute threatening statements,
given the entire factual context in which these statements were made.
Additionally, if a mens rea requirement similar to Kelner is
applied, requiring only a specific intent to threaten, then there need
213. See Planned Parenthood 11, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1191; see also supra notes 159-163 and
accompanying text (discussing Kelner).
214. The maker of the threat could be considered to be the members of American
Coalition of Life Activists, who first compiled the information found on the Nuremberg
Files. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Free Speech Debated in Suit over Anti-Abortion Web Site,
NY TIMES ON THE WEB, (Jan. 13, 1999) <www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/01/biztech/
articles/13abortion.html>.
215. Defendant Michael Bray authored a book entitled A TIME TO KILL, which
contends that killing abortion doctors is justifiable homicide. Defendant C. Roy McMillan
is quoted as saying "it wouldn't bother me if every abortionist in the country today fell
dead from a bullet." Id.
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be no showing that the American Coalition of Life Activists or Neal
Horsley personally intended to carry out the threat against the
abortion providers. Given the statements, both in and out of court, of
those involved in the Web site, an intent to threaten can easily be
inferred.2 16
FACE prohibits "threats of force. '2 17 Whether The Nuremberg
Files is properly considered a "true threat" depends on the factors
adopted for this analysis. If context is taken into account, as it was in
the district court decision, then the verdict should be upheld. If an
intent only to threaten is required, then again, the verdict should be
upheld. If, however, the Ninth Circuit employs a different test, the
decision is vulnerable, making it necessary to evaluate incitement and
fighting words, although FACE does not explicitly refer to or invoke
these doctrines.
(2) Incitement
The Nuremberg Files may also be restricted under an incitement
theory. The true threat and incitement theories overlap in this
context, depending on who is seen as the speaker. If the
speaker/publisher is determined to be the ACLA as the disseminators
of the information, then a true threat analysis suffices. If the 'threat
speaker' is found only to be Neal Horsley, an incitement analysis may
be more appropriate, unless plaintiffs were to allege that Neal
Horsley himself poses a threat. Additionally, if the court requires a
lesser intent showing under a true threat analysis, then in order to
permit the speech to be regulated, plaintiffs need only demonstrate
that Horsley and the ACLA intended to threaten; thus no subsequent
incitement analysis would be necessary3'18
Under the Brandenburg/Claiborne line of cases, incitement is
found where advocacy is directed at imminent lawless action and is
likely to produce such imminent lawless action3' 9 The distinction
between true threats and incitement is extremely unclear. In
Claiborne, Evers' controversial statement was "we're gonna break
your damn neck"220 and the Court used incitement analysis to find
216. See David Hudson, Internet Service Provider Pulls Plug On Nuremberg Files,
FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE (Feb. 5, 1999) <http:llwww.freedomforum.orglspeech/1999/2/
5abortion.asp>.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a).
218. Although the plaintiffs added The Nuremberg Files site to its complaint, they failed
to add Neal Horsley to the list of named defendants. See Planned Parenthood II, 23 F.
Supp. 2d at 1187; Anti-Abortion Internet Site Goes on Trial, THE PATRIOT LEDGER
(Quincy, Mass.), Jan. 7,1999, at 4, available in 1999 WL 8448436.
219. See supra Part IV.A.
220. 458 U.S. 886,902 (1982).
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that statement to be protected speech.221 The incitement doctrine
may provide an effective tool for Internet regulation where the actual
site author is unlikely to carry out personally any threats contained on
the site, because no one can seriously dispute that the site author(s)
support and approve of violence directed at abortion providers.
The "directed to incitement" prong of Brandenburg appears to
be fulfilled by the facts of Planned Parenthood. The message of The
Nuremberg Files implies that all necessary actions should be used to
stop abortion. The reaction of the plaintiffs who were physicians on
the list included, among other things, donning bullet-proof vests
similar to the physician in Dinwiddie32n Unlike Dinwiddie (where the
"true threat" analysis was used), the allegedly wrongful statements
were publicly broadcast over a widely accessible medium. This fact
supports the inciting nature of the statements-by directing this list to
such a wide audience, with the knowledge that someone would use
the list to pick a target, the site operator and author's intent to bring
about this result can be ascertained. Because of the widespread
dissemination of personal information over the Internet, however,
The Nuremberg Files can be considered more dangerous than a direct
personal communication from one person to another. Many people
now have access to addresses, photos, and automobile license plate
numbers through this Internet database. This may serve to increase
the fear factor because, instead of worrying about one person, the
victims must consider anyone who has logged on to the site to be a
real and serious threat to their safety.
Concerns with using incitement theory may arise, however,
depending on the rigidity of the imminence analysis. The Claiborne
Court, for example, looked to the fact that lawless action did not
immediately ensue from Evers' speech.2 3 With the Internet, however,
the speech continues to be communicated as long as the site continues
to operate. Can a site such as The Nuremberg Files be held
responsible for the anti-abortion violence of those who view the site
months, or even years, after it is originally posted? The existence of
such a question demonstrates the inadequacy of current incitement
doctrine as applied to the Internet, which must be further examined if
a serious application of the incitement doctrine to regulation of The
221. A true threat analysis was not used in Claiborne probably because few believed
that Evers himself would carry out the threat; instead, the violence would flow from his
audience. This conclusion, however, assumes that a threat requires the intent to carry out
the threat, instead of an intent to threaten, or put in fear of harm.
222. See Doctor on Internet Abortion List Tells Jury Her Life Is at Risk, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1999, at A5, available in 1999 WL 6042702 (reporting that Dr. Elizabeth
Newhall, plaintiff, testified to receiving a message that her life was at risk, and that she
wears a bulletproof vest in public and carries wigs for disguise).
223. 458 U.S. at 928.
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Nuremberg Files and similar sites is to be entertained. The answer to
this imminence question lies in how imminence is defined. Under
Brandenburg, advocacy can be prohibited if it is (1) directed to
producing imminent lawless action and (2) likely to produce
imminent lawless action.224 If imminence is measured not when the
operator posted the list, but instead from when the site's viewer reads
the list, then incitement is a more plausible theory.
FACE, as it currently exists, does not provide the basis for
prohibiting The Nuremberg Files based on incitement theory. The
incitement doctrine, instead, provides regulators with a method to
attack the practice used by The Nuremberg Files. As with the true
threat doctrine, the context in which this practice is engaged plays an
important role in the target and scope of such regulation, because it
provides facts to support both the "directed to" and "imminence"
prongs of the incitement analysis.
(3) Hate Speech/Fighting Words
Although not raised or addressed in Planned Parenthood, the
question of the applicability of the so-called "fighting words" doctrine
remains. Can Internet communications ever be considered "fighting
words" not protected by the First Amendment, given that "in a
'fighting words' case, we really have a situation like Brandenburg...
but on an individual face-to-face level rather than a mob level?"=
Further, the provocation to violence that may be created using
Internet communications may not necessarily be directed at the
speaker (the poster of the communications); but a situation could be
imagined where violence is directed at someone similarly perceived.
Although not an issue in Planned Parenthood, the use of e-mail
communications presents a different situation, where the fighting
words doctrine is more applicable. A number of universities which
provide unlimited access to the Internet to their students have
attempted to proscribe use of the Internet to harass other students.226
These attempts, however, have been met with allegations of
infringement of free speech.227 State legislatures have also introduced
anti-harassment regulation, and have similarly been subjected to the
same free speech infringement criticisms. 28
A more useful comparison emerges by reviewing these Internet
communication issues under a hate speech analysis. As demonstrated
224. 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
225. 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.40 (1992).
226. See Greenberg, supra note 109, at 136-37.
227. See id. at 147-53.
228. See id. at 153-65.
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by R.A.V., regulations which limit speech because of the viewpoint
expressed are subject to exacting scrutiny. But when such expression
simultaneously interferes with the rights of others (the target of such
speech) by interfering both with their personal security, dignity and
personality, regulation should be permitted to protect the rights of
the target.229 Furthermore, such speech may lack "full value as
political speech because it is not addressed to the citizenry as a whole,
and because.., it does not relate to a matter for the people to
decide." 230 Here, although the legality of abortion is a political issue,
and is properly the subject of debate and discussion, the lives and
freedom of those who legally provide abortion services is not a matter
up for public discussion.
V. The Importance of Context in Evaluating Speech
Regulation
A. Why is context important?
If the right to freedom of speech is a "right inherent in human
nature and republican citizenship," then its boundaries extend to just
short of infringing on the rights of others.231 That is, if speech violates
another's rights, 2 including rights to personal security, bodily
integrity, dignity, and personality, then the speech can be properly
limited or prohibited.P 3 Violence prevention, then, is not merely
preservation of the peace for the benefit of the community; instead, it
encompasses individual rights to physical integrity and personal
liberty234 Speech that incites or threatens violence also interferes
with those individual rights through its impact on the target's mind, as
well as through its effect on third parties.3 5 These rights should not
necessarily be considered of lesser value than the right to freedom of
speech-all of these rights are necessary to maintain a productive
society.
An inquiry into the context of a potentially inciting or
threatening comment is required to determine when speech interferes
with one's rights, as opposed to merely creating discomfort in the
229. See Heyman, supra note 99, at 1382-90.
230. Id. at 1387.
231. Id. at 1279.
232. "Rights" used here does not refer to constitutional rights; instead, it refers to those
rights which "flow from one's status as a person." Id. at 1317.
233. See id. at 1299 (pointing out that in addition, current First Amendment
jurisprudence examines the "opposition between freedom of speech and state interests"
instead of examining opposing rights).
234. See id. at 1300.
235. See id. at 1323.
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target or listener. For example, The Nuremberg Files listed names
and personal information about abortion providers on a Web page
adorned with blood dripping from computer-generated fetus parts,
and described these individuals as "baby butchers." Since 1993, seven
individuals involved in abortion provision have been murdered, in
addition to 14 attempted murders.P 6 Also since 1993, there have
been more than 200 clinic bombings and arsons.237 Being listed on
The Nuremberg Files, combined with the alarming violence statistics,
results in an infringement of the right to personal security.
If the situation were reversed, however, the result would be
different because no right is infringed upon. If Planned Parenthood
decided to post a Web page that listed members of the pro-life
movement, and even described these individuals as "woman-haters,"
pro-life activists could not claim that their right to personal security
had been seriously affected. There is no corresponding context of
violence toward pro-life individuals; thus those listed cannot claim a
right infringement. Evaluating context is necessary to determine
whether speech has exceeded its proper boundaries vis-a-vis others'
rights. A violent context can heighten the impact of speech on its
target in a way that interferes with the target's livelihood.
B. How Should Context be Evaluated?
According to Professor Heyman, a proponent of the "rights-
based" theory of First Amendment analysis, an "act of expression is
presumptively wrongful, and subject to legal regulation, when it (1)
causes (2) an infringement of a fundamental right belonging to
another, and (3) is done with a state of mind that should make the
actor responsible for that result."' 238 Context is implicit in both factors
one and two. As explained in Part VI.A., context is important in
determining when a fundamental right has been infringed, as well as
when an act of expression "causes" such infringement.
The third factor warrants further explanation as to how to
evaluate state of mind. Recognizing that certain speech can greatly
contribute to the political landscape (and the "marketplace of ideas"),
requiring a high intent standard would ensure that not more speech
than necessary is restricted. Such an increased intent standard is
found in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, where the Supreme Court
recognized that criticism of public officials is a desired aspect of a
236. See Roxanne Guillory, Abortion Rights Supporters Challenge Opponents'
Dangerous, Deadly Tactics, NAT'L Now TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL
16986169.
237. See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Protesting Abortion, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 26,
1999, available in 1999 WL 10658430.
238. Heyman, supra note 99, at 1315.
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democratic society, and would impose liability for defamation only if
the public official proves the statement was made with "'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."2 9 Without actual malice or
another similarly heightened intent requirement, like reckless
disregard, the speech remains a "trump" to the interests of the target
of the speech.24  When the context surrounding a particular
communication, however, is so prevalent and well-known, it is more
likely that this heightened requirement for the speaker's intent will be
met by showing that the speaker was aware of an increased risk of
violence pursuant to his speech.
Applying this heightened standard to Planned Parenthood, if The
Nuremberg Files site operator and proponents were unaware of the
existence of anti-abortion violence, or if he did not include the
inflammatory rhetoric or make remarks approving of violence against
abortion providers, this act of expression would fail to meet the
requisite intent. Based on Horsley's and the ACLA's unquestioned
awareness and advocacy of anti-abortion violence, however, the
district court did "find that each defendant acted with specific intent
and malice in a blatant and illegal communication... and with the
specific intent to interfere with or intimidate the plaintiffs from
engaging in legal medical practices and procedures."241
C. Who Should Decide the Content of the Context?
In Planned Parenthood, the district court determined that the
jury should decide whether a threat constitutes a "true threat."2 42
Thus, because the court also held that the threats should be evaluated
"in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding
events and the reactions of the listeners[,J" it follows that the jury was
then also faced with the task of determining what was included in the
"entire factual context."2 43
Because of widespread distrust in allowing juries to decide
important constitutional issues, the Supreme Court has "increased the
power and obligation of appellate courts to review juries' factual
determinations about activity that, depending on the jury's verdict,
may fall within the protection of the first amendment. '244 This
239. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,280 (1964).
240. See Heyman, supra note 99, at 1316.
241. Planned Parenthood 111, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130,1154 (D. Or. 1998).
242. Planned Parenthood I, 945 F. Supp. 1355,1372 n.14 (D. Or. 1996).
243. Planned Parenthood 11, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182,1189-90 (D. Or. 1998) (quoting Lovell,
90 F.3d at 372).
244. Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 761, 765-66 (1986) (noting Bose Corp. v. Consumers' Union of United States Inc.,
466 U.S. 485 (1984)). This article also describes the evolution of the role of juries in First
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doctrine, known as the "constitutional fact" doctrine, allows appellate
courts to apply independent review of critical facts decided by the
trial courts in First Amendment cases.245 This doctrine adequately
protects speech and prevents both juries and trial courts from
restricting too much speech. Thus, with increased appellate review,
either a jury or the court may decide the content of a
communication's surrounding context because the appellate review
provides a safeguard against the "tyranny of the majority."
Conclusion
The Internet presents unique challenges for free speech clausejurisprudence. The increasing availability of this means of
communication to the masses certainly will lead to an increase in the
free exchange of ideas. The sheer power of this medium, however,
dictates that a high level of responsibility must accompany its use.
The question remains, however, whether this responsibility should be
legislated or self-administered.
The ACLA and Neal Horsley appear to fully understand the
power and the desirability of communication in this fashion. Their
use of this medium to disseminate to anyone with a modem what can
rightfully be termed a "hit list" was irresponsible, given the
widespread abortion related violence in this country. The conundrum
presented by this case lies in attempting to figure out at what point
between explicit threats and mere naming of names is government
interference mandated or permitted, and the Internet's implications
on this analysis. The jury in Planned Parenthood v. American
Coalition of Life Activists decided that the proper line should be
drawn when personal information is also included with the naming of
names, given the anti-abortion forces' use of bombings, arson and
bullets to stop abortion providers. Perhaps without this extremely
violent context, the line should be drawn closer to requiring explicit
threats in order to proscribe this speech. A FACE violation requires
that a "threat of force" to intimidate be shown. Worldwide
distribution, which is indeed what the Internet provides with extreme
ease and low cost, of one's home address, accompanied by
inflammatory photos of fetuses, is certainly both intimidating and
threatening. Consideration of the violent context in which this
information distribution has occurred is necessary to evaluate
adequately communications that are threatening or inciting in nature.
Amendment cases. See id.
245. See Steven Alan Childress, Constitutional Fact and Process: A First Amendment
Model of Censorial Discretion, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1229,1233 (1996).
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